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Introduction
This article discusses the two volume White Paper Reforming the Mental Health Act issued by the
Government in December 2000.The two volumes are separately titled The New Legal Framework1
and High Risk Patients2. The foreword to the White Paper appears above the signatures of the
Secretary of State for Health, Alan Milburn, and the Home Secretary, Jack Straw. This is heralded
as an example of ‘joined up government’, and indeed one of the themes of the White Paper is the
need for closer working between the psychiatric and criminal justice systems. The primary policy
goal of the proposals is the management of the risk posed to other people by people with mental
disorder, perhaps best exemplified in Volume One of the White Paper which proclaims that
‘Concerns of risk will always take precedence, but care and treatment should otherwise reflect the
best interests of the patient.’3 This is a clear reflection of the fact that the reforms are taking place
against the background of a climate of concern about homicides by mentally disordered patients,
whether mentally ill, learning disabled, or personality disordered.4
The Government has also had to ensure that their proposals comply with the requirements of the
Human Rights Act 1998, and state that new legislation will be ‘fully compliant’ with the Human
Rights Act.5 The issue of Convention compliance is an important one. In terms of rights, the
traditional concern of mental heath legislation has been to protect patients against arbitrary
detention (Article 5) and to respect their right to protection against inhuman and degrading
treatment (Article 3) or their right to respect for autonomy (Article 8). However, implicit, and
sometimes explicit in the new proposals is a broader concept of rights, going beyond the notion of
patients’ liberty rights to embrace the right of the public to expect that the state will in certain
circumstances protect them against threats to their right to life under Article 2. The classic case on
this is of course Osman v United Kingdom where the European Court of Human Rights held that
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there would be a breach of Article 2 if authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of identified individual or individuals from the
criminal acts of a third party, and failed to take action within the scope of their powers which,
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’6 Clearly the Government has
realised that it enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in balancing the rights of the patient not to
be detained arbitrarily against the ‘rights’ of the public to be protected against violent conduct
from mentally disordered people, and public protection clearly predominates the proposals.
The Government’s primary concern is that too few rather than too many risky people are subject
to compulsory intervention, as is evident from the following passage:
The 1983 Act … fails to address the challenge posed by a minority of people with mental
disorder who pose a significant risk to others as a result of their disorder. It has failed properly
to protect the public, patients or staff. Severely mentally ill patients have been allowed to lose
contact with services once they have been discharged into the community. Such patients have
been able to refuse treatment in the community. And it is the community as well as those
patients which has paid a heavy price. We also need to move away from the narrow concept of
treatability which applies to certain categories of mental disorder in the 1983 Act. New
legislation must be clearly framed so as to allow all those who pose a significant risk of serious
harm to others as a result of their mental disorder to be detained in a therapeutic environment
where they can be offered care and treatment to manage their behaviour.7
The Mental Health Act 1983 is described as ‘outmoded, based on treatment within hospitals,
complex, confusing and lacking in explicit statements of its underlying principles.’ There are two
primary policy goals behind the White Paper. The first is to introduce more effective compulsory
community powers than guardianship or supervised discharge to ensure that patients in the
community are subject to an effective undertaking to carry on with medication. The second main
goal is to ensure that dangerous severely personality disordered patients can be subject to
detention in the mental health system or in some intermediate system of ‘third way’ therapeutic
institutions. In addition there are a number of subsidiary aims, one of which is the abolition of the
nearest relative and their replacement by a nominated person with much more limited powers in
relation to the patient’s care and treatment, shifting the balance away from the rights of families
towards the power of the state to intervene compulsorily. Another is the abolition of the review
functions of hospital managers, which for the most part will be taken over by a new Mental Health
Tribunal. In this article I shall argue that these proposals will bring about a convergence between
the psychiatric and criminal justice systems, with adverse consequences for traditional medical
values such as confidentiality, and a refocusing away from traditional due process rights of patients
towards the rights of the community to be protected from mentally disordered people. 
The White Paper Proposals
The White Paper begins by acknowledging that promoting and supporting good mental health
services is a key responsibility of Government8 and outlining the Government’s investment
programme. It then proceeds to list the Mental Health National Service Framework Standards
which states the legitimate expectations of service users and carers to assessments of their needs,
6 (1998) 29 EHRR 245 at 305.
7 Cm 5016-l, para. 1.15
8 Ibid., Para 1.1.
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to written care plans, to access the service, and to the benefit of suicide prevention strategies. After
statements of the importance of social inclusion and non-discrimination, the Government then
states ‘the two aims of mental health legislation’ in the following terms:
First that those who are seriously ill get appropriate health care to meet their particular needs;
and second, that the public is protected from the small minority of people with mental
disorder who may pose a risk to their safety.9
The fixation on risk management is evident from the fact that a notable absentee from this list is
the traditional aim of protecting patients against ill-treatment or arbitrary use of compulsory
powers. The ascendency of risk management is further exemplified in the combination of broader
powers to detain and treat compulsorily in the community, and there will be a single pathway to
compulsion, a care and treatment order, which will allow either care and treatment under detention
in hospital or compulsory care in the community. 
Mental Disorder
In order to be subject to the new regime of compulsory powers the patient will have to be suffering
from mental disorder which will be broadly defined as ‘Any disability or disorder of mind or brain,
whether permanent or temporary which results in an impairment or disturbance of mental
functioning.’10 The definition is drawn from the Law Commission Report on Mental Incapacity. 
This represents a reversal of the 20th Century trend in mental health legislation towards developing
legal sub-categories of mental disorder, and attaching different admission criteria to each. At the end
of the 19th Century there was separate legislation dealing with lunatics and with idiots and
imbeciles. The Idiots Acts were replaced by the Mental Deficiency Act 1913, which introduced the
concept of mental deficiency, with several subcategories of ‘mental defective’ including moral
imbeciles. Until the Mental Health Act 1959 these separate statutory frameworks continued to
operate, subject to the overarching jurisdiction of the Board of Control, the successor body of the
19th Century Lunacy Commissioners. The 1959 Act brought all mental disorder under one
framework. It allowed compulsory admission for up to 28 days based on the presence of mental
disorder generally defined. Detention under the long-term power to detain for treatment had to be
based on the presence of one of four statutory subcategories of mental disorder The so-called
‘major disorders’ were ‘mental illness’ (undefined) and ‘severe subnormality’. The minor disorders
were ‘subnormality’ and ‘psychopathic disorder’, and here there was a rudimentary treatability test,
as well as an upper age limit on detention unless the patient was dangerous.11
The Mental Health Act 1983 abolished the age limit and relied solely on a treatability test for the
‘minor disorders’, now psychopathic disorder and mental impairment. The drawback of the
treatability test from the Government’s point of view is that it confers clinical discretion on
psychiatrists, which means that doctors may refuse to detain those whom they consider
untreatable. Adoption of the new broad definition of mental disorder is almost equivalent to using
the catch all ‘any other disorder or disability of mind’ which appears at the end of the generic
definition in s. 1 of the current Act. The Government is frank about its intentions: 
It is intended to ensure that the presence, or absence, of any one particular clinical condition
does not limit the discretion of clinicians to consider whether a patient with mental disorder
9 Cm 5016-l, para. 1.13.
10 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.3.
11 Mental Health Act 1983, s 26.
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should be treated under compulsory powers. … This means that no particular clinical diagnosis
will have the effect of limiting the way that the powers are used … It will also help to ensure
that people who require care and treatment under mental health legislation are not excluded
because of too narrow a definition of mental disorder.12
In addition to broadening the definition of mental disorder, it seems that the Government intends
to abandon the limiting clause in s. 1(3) of the 1983 Act, which states that no-one shall be treated as
suffering from mental disorder by reason only of sexual deviancy or addiction to alcohol or drugs.
This reflected the desire to ensure that homosexuals were not subject to detention under mental
health legislation, and the idea that there was little point in compelling addicts to accept treatment
which they did not want. The effect of this has been that a person cannot be detained unless there
is some accompanying mental disorder, such as Korsakoff’s syndrome, in the case of alcoholism. 
There is nothing in Article 5(1)(e), which authorises detention on grounds of unsoundness of
mind, to inhibit such a broad definition. The well-known Winterwerp formula requires only that
the unsoundness of mind must be a true mental disorder established by objective medical
expertise, and that it must be of a nature or degree warranting confinement. Article 5(1)(e) of the
European Convention on Human Rights allows detention on grounds of alcoholism or addiction
to drugs, but the European Court of Human Rights was emphatic in Winterwerp that detention on
grounds of unsoundness of mind under Article 5(1)(e) did not authorise detention on grounds of
mere deviance from society’s norms.’13
The broadening of the definition of mental disorder on its own will have the effect of narrowing
the mesh of the net of compulsory powers, more people will be liable to detention, and more
people to compulsory medication in the community. Before turning to the question of treatability,
it is important to examine the new framework of compulsory assessment and treatment, ‘the single
pathway’ to compulsion.
The Single Pathway
There will be a single pathway to compulsory care and treatment. What this means is that the same
decision-making procedures will apply to compulsory treatment in hospital or in the community.
Instead of separate procedures for detention (hospital based) and, supervised discharge (which requires
a previous period of detention) and guardianship (local authority social services based) there will be
one single pathway to either form of compulsion. This is based initially on powers very similar to the
current s. 2 admission for assessment under the 1983 Act. The patient will be able to be subjected to
compulsory assessment for up to 28 days on the authority of two doctors and a social worker or other
‘mental health professional with specific training in the application of the new legislation.’14 The major
difference in personnel will be that the Government appears to be contemplating using community
psychiatric nurses as applicants as well as the current Approved Social Workers. The current system
is based on the fact that the application comes from an ASW who is specially trained in this work,
who is employed independently of the hospital authorities, and who exercises individual statutory
discretion as to whether it is necessary to make an application. The addition of ‘another mental health
professional’ as a potential applicant is intended to involve community psychiatric nurses (CPNs).
CPNs have traditionally worked under the direction of psychiatrists. ASWs currently undergo 60 days
12 Cm 5016-l, paras. 3.3 – 3.5.
13 Winterwerp v the Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387.
14 Cm 5016-1, para. 3.14.
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of specialist training to receive their warrant, and similar training will be needed for CPNs. 
The principle of independent checks and balances and the notion that admission is a much a social as
a medical matter are both greatly diluted by these proposals.
The criteria for compulsory assessment are that: (a) the patient must be suffering from mental
disorder that is sufficiently serious to warrant further assessment or urgent treatment by the specialist
mental health services; and (b) without such intervention the patient is likely to be at significant risk
of serious harm, including deterioration in health, or pose significant risk of serious harm to other
people. The specialist mental health service is defined as care and treatment for mental disorder
provided under the management of a clinical supervisor.15 In contrast to the responsible medical
officer under the 1983 Act, a clinical supervisor need not be a psychiatrist, he or she could be a
clinical psychologist16, and this may be more likely where the patient has a personality disorder or a
learning disability. Currently the criteria for admission for assessment under s. 2 are that that person
has mental disorder, in the general sense, of a nature or degree warranting assessment, and that the
patient’s detention for assessment is warranted in the interests of their health or safety or for the
protection of others. The proposed new test will be that the mental disorder warrants assessment or
urgent treatment by the specialist psychiatric service, in other words bad enough to see a consultant
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. Under the new criteria, the risk will have to be significant. This
may be thought, and intended, to be a dilution of the ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ which appears
in the supervised discharge criteria in ss 25A-H of the 1983 Act. But neither term refers to statistical
probabilities. ‘Substantial’ means having substance, and significant means having ‘significance’. How
much substance or significance they have to have is a matter for the decision-maker, and presumably
also for the Code of Practice to be issued to accompany the Act. 
During the 28 day period no treatment without the consent of the patient, other than urgent
treatment, can take place before a written care plan has been produced.17 This is the equivalent under
the existing Act of the provision that Part lV, which authorises treatment without consent, does not
apply until the second medical opinion has been furnished to convert an emergency 72 hour
admission into an admission for assessment under s. 2.18 There will be a requirement to prepare a
written care plan within three days unless there are exceptional circumstances making this
impractical.19 The treatment plan ‘may in the initial stages be quite simple’, but once there has been a
full assessment it will have to set out in detail what is to be provided, in line with the Care Programme
Approach, which means that there must be a key worker, a risk assessment, a needs assessment, a
written care plan, and regular review.20 There can be no compulsion beyond 28 days unless the Mental
Health Tribunal (MHT) makes a compulsory care and treatment order or makes a further order for
assessment, and patients have a ‘fast track right of appeal’ to the MHT during the first 28 days. 
Care and Treatment Orders
One of the main changes proposed is in the role of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. Currently
it reviews the need for continued detention, decisions to detain being made by mental health
professionals, hospital managers and the courts. The new tribunal will be a Mental Health Tribunal
(MHT), which will be the body which makes the decision to impose the care and treatment order
15 Ibid., p. 62
16 Ibid., p. 58.
17 Ibid., para. 3.38.
18 Mental Health Act 1983, s. 56.
19 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.17.
20 Ibid., para. 3.19.
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which will be for a maximum period of six months in the first instance, renewable by the MHT for
a further six months and thereafter at yearly intervals. Despite the disappearance of the word
‘Review’ from its title the MHT will have review functions. The patient has a ‘fast track’ right to
apply to the MHT against detention for assessment and has the ‘right to request that the tribunal
reviews any order for compulsory care and treatment lasting longer than three months.’21 If this
means that the patient will be entitled to apply for a tribunal after three months, on current delay
rates, the hearing will be happening within very few weeks of the next hearing to renew the order.
And there will be problems of independence. Will the MHT panel which hears the review be
differently constituted to the MHT which imposed the care and treatment order? 
The MHT will consist of a legally qualified chair and two other members with experience of
mental health services. One of the members will be a person with ‘a clinical background’ and the
other will usually have a background in community or voluntary sector service provision.22 When
the clinical supervisor applies to the Tribunal for authority to continue the compulsory care and
treatment beyond 28 days patient arrangements will be made for the patient to be seen by an
independent doctor drawn from a panel of experts appointed by the Commission for Mental
Health to give expert evidence to the tribunal. This task will have to be carried out by a doctor, but
the expert panel will have a broad membership. The doctors will be drawn from a variety of
backgrounds, general, old age, learning disability, child and forensic, and also from clinical
psychology. The expert panel will also include people with experience in ethnic minority issues,
social care, learning disability nursing, mental health nursing and, tellingly, the probation service.23
The medical members of the panel will perform the role currently undertaken by medical
members of tribunals, but they will be expert witnesses, no longer tribunal members. They will
also take over the role undertaken by second opinion appointed doctors (SOADs) under Part lV
of the 1983 Act. Moreover, they will have the function of visiting all patients who are assessed as
long term incapable and in need of treatment from the specialist service.
At a 28 day review the MHT will have the option of discharging the patient, of authorising a further
28 days assessment, or of making a care and treatment order.24 The criteria for the tribunal to make
a care and treatment order will be: (a) a diagnosis of mental disorder of a nature or degree to warrant
specialist treatment; and (b) that specialist treatment must be necessary in the best interests of the
patient and/or because without care and treatment there is a significant risk of harm to other people;
and (c) a plan of care and treatment is available to address the mental disorder. 
A number of features of these criteria deserve comment. First of all this is a break with the
approach of the 1959 and 1983 Act that detention under long term powers should require a more
specific ‘diagnosis’. The same broad concept of mental disorder applies to admission for
assessment and to the longer term care and treatment order. Secondly the ‘necessary in the
interests of the patient’s own health or safety’ criterion is to be replaced by ‘necessary in the best
interests of the patient’, and the ‘or necessary for the protection of other persons’ criterion by
‘because without care and treatment there is a significant risk of harm to other people.’ 
The best interests criterion is presumably an attempt to introduce common law concepts into the
Mental Health Act. The Green and White Papers have apparently rejected the idea of employing
a test based on capacity, although at the time of writing there are suggestions that the Government
may be considering introducing a test based on impaired judgment due to mental disorder. 
21 Ibid, para. 3.61.
22 Ibid., para. 3.44
23 Ibid., paras. 3.45-3.47..
24 Ibid., para. 3.42.
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At common law doctors have a power and a duty to give incapacitated patients treatment which is
necessary in their best interests. At common law the gatekeeper concept is incapacity and best
interests refers to the doctor’s duty once there has been a finding of incapacity. It is the doctor’s
duty to consider a wider range of interests than the purely medical, including social interests. 
The doctor must then balance the certain and the possible gains against the certain and the possible
losses, and only if the account is in significant credit should the treatment be viewed as being in
the patient’s best interests.25 In Re SL the Court of Appeal held that ‘the doctor ought not to make
any decision about a patient that did not fall within the broad spectrum of the Bolam26 test. 
This might give the doctor more than one option since there may well be more than one acceptable
medical opinion. But then the doctor has to move on to consider the best interests of the patient,
and this involves choosing the best option.27
It seems that there will be a statutory definition of best interests which will be at variance with the
common law concept, and the White Paper sets out a number of considerations to be taken into
account in deciding whether continuing care and treatment is in a patient’s best interests. These
include:
The nature and degree of the disorder – what and how severe the symptoms are, how the
disorder is likely to develop and what interventions are appropriate. The clinical team should
take account of any information that is available about how the patient has responded to
treatment in the past, whether they have complied with care and treatment and what are the
risks of not treating them. This will include consideration of how the mental disorder may
affect the patient’s capacity to make decisions about treatment. Second the team should take
account of the patient’s expressed wishes and preferences supported, where appropriate, by an
advocate. Thy also need to consider whether overriding the patient’s wishes may make it more
difficult to deliver effective care and treatment.28
Despite all this statutory guidance the fact remains that a concept which has not traditionally been
used as a gatekeeper concept is being pressed into service as such by the White Paper, and it is
difficult to see how this is an improvement on ‘necessary in the interests of the patient’s health.’
Patients challenging care and treatment orders will be able to argue that the treatment plan is not
in their best interests, and patients or representatives of patients who are not detained but who will
be subject to the new procedures for patients with long term incapacity will have the right to seek
a review of the care and treatment plan if there are concerns about the content or whether it is
being delivered in the patient’s best interests’29 This will bring the tribunal for the first time into
deliberations about the nature and quality of treatment offered to patients subject to compulsion.
Hitherto their jurisdiction has been to decide whether or not to discharge patients. 
The treatability test, although widely interpreted to include treatment of the symptoms and
sequelae of mental disorder, and to include anger management in a structured environment, has
been seen by the Government as a major ‘fault line’ in the legislation.30 The White Paper applies
different criteria of ‘treatability’ depending on whether compulsion is in the patient’s best interests
or because there is a significant risk of harm to other people. In cases where the use of compulsory
25 Re A (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) (1999) 53
B.M.L.R. 66 at 77).
26 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee
[1957] 2 All ER 118, [1957] 1 WLR 582.
27 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment [2000] 2
FCR 452..
28 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.24 - 3.25.
29 Cm 5016-l, para. 6.11.
30 B v Croydon District Health Authority [1995] 1 All ER
683; Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 1 All
ER 481. 
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powers arises in the person’s own best interests, the treatment plan must be anticipated to be of
direct therapeutic benefit to the individual. Therapeutic benefit will cover ‘improvement in the
symptoms of mental disorder or slowing down deterioration and the management of behaviours
arising from the disorder. This would include only behaviours which lead to significant adverse
consequences for the patient such as suicide or serious self-harm, or serious deterioration in
physical health.’ (emphasis added).31 In cases where the compulsory powers are sought primarily
because of the risk the patient poses to others, the plan must be considered necessary directly to
treat the underlying disorder or to manage behaviours arising from the disorder. In such a case the
care plan must include the provision of interventions that are specifically designed to ameliorate
the behaviours that cause them to be a risk.32 Care and treatment for mental disorder will not be
defined in new legislation. Instead, each plan of treatment must indicate what symptoms or
behaviours arising from mental disorder it is intended to address, thus ensuring that ‘the Tribunal
considers any issues regarding the limits of care and treatment for mental disorder.’33
The purpose of this refined approach to treatability is to make it clear that people with personality
disorders may be detained even if the only treatment available is addressed at the behaviour which
causes them to be a risk to others rather than at the ‘core disorder.’ The net effect of these changes
will be to make it clear that a much larger number of people will be liable to compulsion under
mental health legislation, and the procedural changes contained in the White Paper are also aimed
at ensuring the primacy of risk management. Transparency, uniformity and ownership of
psychiatric decision-making are key themes in the White Paper. Discretionary powers to detain will
be broadened through a widening of the definition of mental disorder, and the relevant trust will
be required, when called upon to do so by the nominated person, the patient’s General Practitioner
(GP), the police or other criminal justice agencies to send mental health professionals to carry out
an assessment of the need for compulsion. Under the current legislation an ASW who is called
upon by the nearest relative to carry out an assessment must give reasons in writing when he or she
does not make an application for admission34, so it is likely that the mental health professionals will
be required to give written reasons to GPs, police or other criminal justice agencies for not using
those powers. This prompts the question whether those reasons, if inadequate, could be used to
found a damages action based on Article 2 and the Osman principle brought by the family of a
victim of a homicide by a mentally disordered person. In such a case, if the police or probation
ask for an assessment and those carrying out the assessment decline to use compulsory powers,
they give their reasons. If there was a risk to an identified individual or individuals, and the
authorities failed to take action within the scope of their powers, which judged reasonably might
have been expected to avoid the risk, the authorities would be liable under the Osman principle.
This will inevitably lead to an expansion in defensive medicine and defensive practice from other
professionals involved in the assessment process.
A further major change is the abolition of the statutory role of nearest relative and its replacement
with the nominated person. Currently the nearest relative can ask for an assessment of the need for
compulsory admission, can apply for compulsory admission, and has the right, where practicable
to be consulted about an admission for treatment for up to six months. If the nearest relative
objects, no application for admission for treatment may proceed, subject to displacement by the
county court if the objection is unreasonable. This right of veto is not available in relation to
31 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.21.
32 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.18.
33 Cm 5016-l, para. 3.20.
34 Mental Health Act 1983, s 13(4).
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admission for assessment under s 2. The nearest relative is also entitled to ask for the discharge of
a patient detained under the non-offender provisions of the 1983 Act, and the patient must be
discharged unless it is certified by the responsible medical officer (RMO) that the patient is
dangerous to self or to others. The nearest relative can appeal to the Mental Health Review Tribunal
against refusal of discharge, and is also entitled to notice of any tribunal application for discharge
made by the patient, a provision which was challenged in JT v United Kingdom35. Here the patient
objected to her mother being her nearest relative, given that she was living with the man who had
allegedly abused her. This was held to be a breach of Article 8 of the Convention, in that the patient
did not have any say in who could exercise the functions of nearest relative. The Government’s
response to this is that role of nearest relative and the powers attached will be removed by the new
legislation to be replaced by nominated person who will be nominated by the mental health
professional applying for compulsory powers, and the nominated person will have the right to be
consulted over the exercise of compulsory powers, and will have the right to apply to the tribunal
for review of the use of compulsory powers, but will have no power of veto or discharge.36
This is a major transfer of power from the family to the state, and a departure from the principle
that the family is entitled to take care of their loved one’s health needs, but the state may override
that if the person is dangerous to self or to others. Nearest relatives have successfully challenged
applications for admission, where the wrong relative has been consulted, and have successfully
applied to tribunals for the patient’s discharge on grounds that they were not dangerous.37 To allow
the very person whose actions might be challenged to nominate the nominated person, and to take
away the family’s express powers and replace them with a consultation duty, when added to all the
other reforms, represents an almost complete dismantling of the delicate system of checks devised
to reflect the balance of perspectives between the state, health and social care professionals and the
family. The proposals for a legal framework for the care and treatment of non-offender patients
will broaden considerably the scope of compulsion under mental health legislation, and will
undoubtedly lead to a significant increase in the numbers of patients who are subject to
compulsory powers. Before looking at the safeguards for patients, it is important to see the
proposals in the context of the second volume of the White Paper, entitled High Risk Patients. 
High Risk Patients
High Risk Patients sets the new legal framework for detaining non-offender patients in the context
of the changes to the criminal justice system. The Volume begins with a statement that the
majority of patients who are detained are detained in their own best interests and defines high risk
as covering ‘a smaller group characterised primarily by the risk which they pose to others. 
It includes both those detained under civil powers and offenders who have been given a mental
health disposal and a restriction order.’38 Although the Government acknowledges that no society
can ever be totally free of the risk of serious harm. ‘where there are deficiencies in the provision
of specialist services, as in the case of DPSD, the public rightly expects the Government to take
action, and the clear aim of the proposals is to remedy ‘weaknesses in the law’ which stand in the
way of detention of dangerous people with severe personality disorders.39
35 European Commission on Human Rights Decision as to
Admissibility Application 26494/95 26 February 1997,
(1997) EHRR CD 81.
36 Cm 5016-l, paras. 5.5 – 5.9.
37 Re S-C (Mental Patient: Habeas Corpus) [1996] 1 All
ER 532. 
38 Cm 5016-ll, para. 1.3.
39 Ibid., para. 1.8.
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The proposals for high risk patients need to be understood in the context of what the Government
calls ‘the full package’ of criminal justice reforms. These include the requirement that sex offenders
register with the police on leaving prison under the Sex Offenders Act 1997, sex offender orders
under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and automatic life sentences for a second serious violent
or sexual offence under the Crime Sentences Act 1997. The Home Office has also introduced an
Early Warning System’ to alert the Home Office to the imminent release of potentially dangerous
violent or sexual offenders and enable the risk management arrangements for those offenders to be
monitored. Further measures are being developed to strengthen the effectiveness of child
protection law, and to put police and probation service risk management strategies on a statutory
basis to improve standards. Measures are also being taken to prevent sex or violent offenders
against children from working with them on release, and to introduce electronic tagging as
condition of licence.
High Risk Offender Patients
As for mentally disordered offenders, the new broad definition of mental disorder will apply, and
the current range of remand powers for assessment and for treatment under ss. 35 and 36, and the
interim hospital order under s. 38 will be replaced by a single power of remand for assessment or
treatment based on a single medical recommendation. However, a second medical recommendation
will be required before compulsory treatment can be given. The remand may be to detention in
hospital or on bail, and will be available to both magistrates and higher courts. Remand will be for
an initial period of 28 days renewable by Court for up to a year. 
There are three provisions in English law for protective sentencing, life imprisonment, protective
sentencing under sections 1(2)(b) and 2(2)(b) (longer than normal) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991,
and the new procedures for mandatory minimum sentences in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997,
whereby conviction of a second serious violent or sexual offence attracts a mandatory life
sentence. These comparatively recent developments are intended to bring about wider use of
indeterminate sentencing in the penal system, although the Government is clearly disappointed
that these powers are not being used as extensively as they had hoped. They are also concerned
about the numbers of prisoners with personality disorders who are coming to the end of
determinate sentences and will be entitled to release regardless of risk.
Where an offender is suffering from mental disorder in the new broad sense, it will be open to any
criminal court to impose a care and treatment order which will last for six months before requiring
to be continued by the Mental Health Tribunal. Where a mentally disordered offender poses a
significant risk of serious harm to others or because of the nature of the offence or previous
convictions, the court may impose a care and treatment order with restrictions. This will be
applicable only where the care and treatment order is based on detention in hospital. The major
disadvantage of hospital and restriction orders from the Government’s point of view is that a
patient may be entitled to discharge by a Mental Health Review Tribunal if no longer mentally
disordered before he or she has served a period of detention proportionate to the gravity of the
offence. The Government seeks to rectify this by extending the availability of the hospital and
limitation direction, which currently applies only to offenders with psychopathic disorder, to all
offenders suffering from mental disorder in the new broad sense. This will enable the court to have
the option of combining criminal justice tariff with an order for care and treatment under the
mental health legislation. Patients will be able to be transferred from prison as under current
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legislation, but on expiry of their sentence, continued care and treatment will have to be
authorised by the MHT. 
The proposals for mentally disordered offenders show some small but significant changes to the
current framework. These are broadening the definition of mental disorder which will form the
basis of a hospital disposal, simplifying the remand powers for treatment and assessment,
extending the hospital and limitation direction to all mentally disordered patients, and to comply
with the Strasbourg decision in James Kay v United Kingdom40 the introduction of express statutory
criteria for recall of restricted patients to hospital. Unless it is an emergency the authorities must
satisfy themselves that the patient continues to suffer from a mental disorder within the meaning
of the new legislation and is failing to co-operate with care plan, and/or his continued presence in
community poses risk of serious harm to others and/or the care and treatment needed cannot
safely be provided in the community. The most significant changes are in the provision made for
the involvement of criminal justice agencies in mental health care decisions, a development which
is largely fuelled by the Government’s desire to manage the problem of Dangerous People with
Severe Personality Disorder.
High Risk Non-Offender Patients
The primary focus of the High Risk Patients proposals is on Dangerous People with Severe
Personality Disorder (DPSPD patients). Having put forward two options, one involving the use of
existing prison and health service institutions, the other involving the development of new
specialist ‘third way institutions’41, the Government has not taken a final decision on how services
will best be provided long-term. However, it will ‘bring forward the legislative changes required’
whichever option is chosen, and there will be a ‘new framework for the detention of DPSPD in a
therapeutic environment for as long as they pose a risk to others as a result of mental disorder.42
The new powers ‘will apply to individuals in civil proceedings as well as those sentenced for an
offence’, that is, it will not be necessary to be convicted of an offence to be subject to detention.
However, the Government assures us that in practice, the nature of the assessment process 
(12 weeks long) means that it is highly unlikely that any individual without a long track record of
increasingly serious offending will be affected by these new powers.43 Although the Government is
worried about this group, they offer only a working definition. The person must show significant
disorder of personality and present a significant risk of causing serious physical or psychological
harm from which the victim would find it difficult or impossible to recover e.g. homicide, rape, or
arson. The risk presented must appear to be functionally linked to his personality disorder. 
The Government intends to ‘refine the definition during the pilot period as we develop a clearer
picture of the nature and characteristics of this group.’44 The ‘treatability’ requirement in the
current legislation is described as ‘unhelpful’ as it has neither met the needs of patients nor helped
to give the public the protection it needs. The new ‘civil admission’ procedures will in the
Government’s view provide the unambiguous authority to detain individuals who would fall
within the DPSPD group where appropriate interventions are offered to tackle the individual’s high
risk behaviour. In all cases treatment will be delivered in an appropriate therapeutic environment. 
40 James Kay v United Kingdom (1998) 40 BMLR 20 
41 Home Office and Department of Health, Managing
Dangerous People with a Severe Personality Disorder
July 1999.
42 Cm 5016-ll, para. 2.12.
43 Ibid., 2.13
44 Ibid., para. 2.18
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The important aspect of the new civil procedures is that they enable pressure to be exerted by
criminal justice agencies on mental health professionals to assist in managing risk. We have already
seen how police and criminal justice agencies will be able to request a mental health assessment and
will be entitled to reasons if compulsory powers are not used. The Sex Offenders Act 1997 puts a
duty on the police to monitor those offenders who are on the sex offender register, and MARPs
have been set up to meet these requirements. The White Paper reports that ‘Many panels have
subsequently extended their remit to respond to the risks posed by other potentially dangerous
offenders in their communities and a range of other agencies are now involved in local
arrangements, led by police and probation services.’45 The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act
2000 places a statutory duty on police and probation services to establish arrangements for the
assessment and management of risks posed by relevant sexual or violent offenders in the
community and to monitor those arrangements. The duty extends to patients who have been
detained on a hospital order as well as those sentenced to imprisonment, so that information will
have to be shared with police when violent or sex offenders are discharged from hospital. 
If compulsory powers to assess non-offender patients are used at the request of criminal justice
agencies, they, and other agencies involved in formal risk management arrangements in the
community (i.e. Multi-Agency Risk Panels (MARPS)) will be able to provide evidence before the
tribunal, independent of the assessment of the clinical team. This may include evidence of previous
criminal behaviour. Tribunal will have a duty to consider such evidence in making its decision.
When a tribunal orders supervision in the community, this may include involvement of MARPs.46
The White Paper also indicates the Government’s intention to introduce a ‘new statutory duty
covering the disclosure of patient information between health and social services and other
agencies for example housing and criminal justice agencies where it is justified, for example in the
public interest.’ The new duty is intended to ‘support these new risk management arrangements
led by the criminal justice system.’47
The purpose of these provisions is to bridge the information barriers between health and social
services with their emphasis on individualistic health and social care values such as confidentiality,
and the police, whose primary task is risk management. This necessarily entails the incorporation
of the police into what previously were health and social care decisions. The right of privacy under
Article 8 of the European Convention allows for exceptions to the confidentiality of medical
records if it is in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of
crime, for health, or for the protection of the rights of others. Given the breadth of these
exceptions, it is unlikely that the new statutory duty of disclosure would fall foul of Article 8,
provided that those making decisions to share information without the consent of the subject
observe the requirement to restrict this to a need to know basis, and to bear in mind the principle
of proportionality, that the method chosen to achieve the protection of the public interest does
not go beyond what is strictly necessary for that purpose. The provisions on information sharing
are a classic example of risk management values justifying exceptions to the medical principle of
confidentiality. It also shows a desire to limit clinical discretion by imposing a duty to share
information, and it also opens up the possibility of a Tarasoff type action for breach of that
statutory duty, if a person suffers damage as a result.48
45 Ibid., paras. 5.4 - 5.6.
46 Ibid., paras. 3.22-3.23.
47 Ibid., para. 5.7.
48 Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California
(1976) 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.Sup. Ct.).
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Safeguards
The current system of safeguards for patients rights is based on local review of the need for
detention by hospital managers, formal review of detention by the Mental Health Review Tribunal
and the supervisory role of the Mental Health Act Commssion which visits and interviews
detained patients, reviews the handling of their complaints, and oversees the system of statutory
second opinions under Part lV of the 1983 Act. The White Paper affords a central role to the new
Mental Health Tribunal, and abolishes the review function of the hospital managers. The Mental
Health Act Commission will be replaced by a Commission for Mental Health, which will consist
of representatives of users, carers and the key professional bodies. Its remit is described as being
‘similar to that of the existing Mental Health Act Commission but without its current
responsibilities for visiting’:
Instead there will be a fresh emphasis on monitoring the implementation of the safeguards
which ensure that compulsory powers are properly used. It will have significant new
responsibilities for collecting and analysing information, and overseeing standards of
professional advocacy and training for practitioners with key roles under the new legislation. It
will also have an important role in overseeing the arrangements for the care of patients with
long-term incapacity under the new legislation.49
Issues of quality and consistency of services will be matters for the Commission for Health
Improvement or the National Care Standards Commission. The role of the Commission in relation
to complaints will be taken on by the new specialist Patient Advocacy Liaison Service (PALS). The
Commission will have a particular remit to advise the Secretary of State as to whether the powers
in the Act are being used in a manner consistent with the principles, set out in Chapter 2 of the
White Paper, which ‘will be set out in a way that provides a clear context for decisions about when
and how the new powers should be used.’50 The principles are that the new legislation will be
compatible with the Human Rights Act 1998, that decision-making will be conducted openly and
fairly, with respect for patients individual characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and religion,
that formal powers will not be used as an alternative to securing the agreement of people whose
disabilities result in communication difficulties, that mentally disordered people will be treated in
such a way as to promote to the greatest degree their self-determination and personal responsibility,
that care and treatment will involve the least degree of restriction consistent with ensuring that the
objectives of the treatment plan are met, and that formal powers should only be used with good
cause and when alternatives have been considered.51 None of these principles is new. They are all
currently stated in the Mental Health Act Code of Practice.52 It is not clear from the White Paper
whether these will be specified in the legislation itself or in a new Code of Practice.
There will continue to be a statutory system of second opinions based largely on the existing
system, but provided by doctors and others appointed by the Commission for Mental Health to
give expert evidence to the MHT. ‘The function of the second opinion doctor will be to consider
whether the treatment is consistent with acceptable practice in the treatment of patients with
mental disorder.’53 The major difference will be that psychosurgery, which cannot currently be
administered unless the patient is capable of consenting and has consented, will be able to be given
49 Cm 5016-1, para. 7.8.
50 Ibid., para. 2.8.
51 Ibid., paras. 2.7 – 2.12.
52 Department of Health and the Welsh Office, Mental
Health Act Code of Practice (1999), para. 1.1.
53 Cm 5016-l, para. 5.25.
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if approved by the High Court.54 There will be guidance in the new Code of Practice on the
administration of polypharmacy, and of drugs in excess of British National Formulary upper dose
recommendations, and the tribunal, in considering the treatment plan, will consider how and to
what extent the treatment plan takes account of any guidance in the code.55
The new Mental Health Tribunal will be the most important of the institutions providing
safeguards. It will authorise compulsory care and treatment, and it will review the continued need
for such compulsion. When a patient is admitted for assessment, his or her clinical supervisor will
in an appropriate case, make a recommendation to the MHT for a care and treatment order. The
MHT will then decide, on the basis of the evidence, whether the conditions for continuing care
and treatment under compulsion are met. In making its decision the MHT is required to consider
the proposed care and treatment plan and the report from the panel medical expert and any
evidence put by the patient or his or her representative.56
It seems that the Government will reverse the notorious negative burden of proof in that the MHT
will have to be satisfied that the criteria for compulsory care and treatment are met before initiating
or renewing an order. However, there is some lack of clarity as to whether the MHT will have a
power or a duty to make an order if so satisfied. Paragraph 3.43 says that ‘If the MHT considers
that the criteria are met and the care and treatment plan is appropriate it will make a care and
treatment order.’ Paragraph 3.49 says that ‘If the tribunal is satisfied that the conditions for
compulsory care and treatment are satisfied, it will have the power to approve a care and treatment
order. If conditions are not met, the patient will be discharged.’ Finally, Paragraph 3.50 states that
the Tribunal will be ‘required to make a care and treatment order if care and treatment plan
proposed by patient’s clinical supervisor meets the criteria set out in the legislation, and is
appropriate in all the circumstances. Legislation will include provision for the situation where care
and treatment order is warranted but treatment plan is inappropriate.’ Where the patient is not
liable to detention following a court order (i.e. is a non-offender patient) he or she will have the
right, to request that the MHT review any order for compulsory care and treatment lasting longer
than three months. ‘The purpose of the review will be to determine whether the current
arrangements under compulsory powers are appropriate.’57 Leaving aside the question of whether
there will be a power or a duty to make an order when the criteria are satisfied, this will involve
the tribunal in a whole new range of questions concerning the appropriateness of treatment, and
will significantly increase the duration of tribunal hearings.
The MHT’s powers will include the power to make ‘flexible orders.’ The care and treatment order
will include a treatment plan, and the tribunal will be required to consider the appropriate location
for treatment, and whether care under detention is necessary. It will have the power to specify
duration up to the statutory maximum. Where the patient is not detained the treatment plan will
specify which aspects of the care plan are compulsory, and the consequences of non-compliance.
Where the patient subject to a care and treatment order outside hospital those responsible are
required to ensure that services provided in a manner enabling the patient to comply. Patients will
not be charged for service specified in the order as something they must comply with.58 If the
patient is detained, the plan will specify whether he or she may be granted leave or discharged by
the clinical supervisor, or whether these powers will be reserved to the MHT.59
54 Ibid., para. 5.19.
55 Ibid., para. 5.23.
56 Ibid., para. 3.48.
57 Ibid., para. 3.61.
58 Ibid., paras 3.56-3.58.
59 Ibid., para. 3.51.
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In each case involving a care and treatment order, the patient will be seen by a member of the expert
panel prior to the hearing. The Government envisages that there will not necessarily be a hearing to
approve a care and treatment order. A hearing will be required where the patient requests or there
is a difference of opinion between clinical supervisor and expert panellist Otherwise the tribunal
will review the case on the papers which must include the expert panellist’s opinion.60 A further
important development is the introduction of rights for victims and their families to make
representations to the MHT against an offender patient returning to the area of the index offence.
The Tribunal and the Commission for Mental Health will also play a key role in providing
safeguards for people with long-term incapacity, filling the so-called ‘Bournewood Gap’ identified by
Lord Steyn in R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust ex parte L.61 The new
legislation will place a duty on clinical supervisors to carry out an assessment and obtain an
independent second opinion from an expert panellist, where patients with long term incapacity are
assessed as needing long-term care and treatment for serious mental disorder from specialist
mental health services in their best interests. This will apply to patients admitted to hospital or
residential care home, but not to those living at home.62 The clinical supervisor will be required to
arrange a full assessment and develop a care plan on the basis of the care programme approach and
the Care Plan Guidance in Wales. This must cover all aspects of care and treatment including steps
to restrict patients’ freedom such as locking of doors or routine sedatives. All interventions must
be in patient’s best interests. The clinical supervisor must arrange for doctor from Tribunal Panel
to examine the patient. The doctor from the panel will discuss the proposed care and treatment
plan with supervisor and may suggest changes. 
In drawing up the treatment plan the clinical supervisor must consult the patient’s close relatives
and carers, and consult the social care representative who nominates a person to represent the
patient. The clinical supervisor must notify the Commission for Mental Health that a plan is being
drawn up and, unless there are exceptional circumstances, finalise it within 28 days. Th supervisor
must then place on record with the care and treatment plan a note that in his or her opinion the
care and treatment plan is in the patient’s best interests. The supervisor must also certify that the
patient is not actively resisting treatment and does not pose a significant risk of serious harm to
other people, otherwise it will be necessary to seek compulsory powers. The patient or his or her
representative will be able to apply to the MHT either to challenge detention or to seek review of
the care and treatment plan, for example on the grounds that it is not in the patient’s best interests.
MHT will commission new report from a member of its medical panel, and will also consider
evidence from the clinical team, and, if appropriate, from carers and close relatives. The clinical
supervisor will be required to take account of changes suggested by the MHT and if necessary
submit a revised care plan to the MHT for formal approval. However the expectation is that any
dispute would be resolved informally through discussion with the clinical team without recourse
to the tribunal.63 The Government has chosen to provide this form of safeguard in preference to
an Incapacity Act, whereby care managers or health care attorneys could be appointed by a new
locally based Court of Protection. The danger is that the Mental Health Tribunal will be
overwhelmed by a vast increase in its case load. Between 1986 and 1998 the number of tribunal
60 Ibid., para. 3.63.
61 [1998] 3 All ER 289. See further P. Fennell, ‘Doctor
Knows Best? Therapeutic detention under Common
Law, the Mental Health Act, and the European
Convention’ (1998) 6 Med Law Rev 322-353. 
62 Cm 5016-l, para. 6.5.
63 Ibid., paras 6.7 - 6.13. 
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hearings held annually increased from 2972 to 9,057.64 The new proposals are likely to lead to an
even more dramatic increase in case load, even with the provisions for paper review rather than
personal hearings, and will undoubtedly lead to longer hearings, since the tribunal will be looking
not only at the need for compulsion, but also at the nature and quality of the treatment plan. 
Conclusion
The proposals in the White Paper involve a radical change in the legal framework of compulsory
mental health care. They place a premium on risk management with significant consequences for 
the psychiatric system, and the relations between psychiatrists, psychologists and the state. 
The Government appears to be just as worried about psychiatrists who will not co-operate in its risk
management project as it is about uncooperative patients. A prime aim of the proposals is to
introduce uniformity and accountability of psychiatric decision-making and to encourage the use of
compulsory powers. It does this by broadening the discretionary powers to impose compulsory
treatment and by removing any provisions which give clinicians discretion not to impose treatment
under compulsion. It is for this reason that the Government is keen to avoid use of concepts like
incapacity which are open to subjective judgment. The proposals will alter the relationship between
psychiatrists and their patients in subtle and sometimes not so subtle ways, imposing duties to
disclose information where a patient is thought to pose a risk of harm to others. They will also alter
the balance between the rights of the family and the power of the state in relation to psychiatric
compulsion by replacing nearest relatives with nominated persons with more limited powers. 
The White Paper will also bring about a convergence, bordering on merger between the psychiatric
system and the penal system and the legal status of prisoner and patient. With increasing use of
life sentences, prisoners and patients will be subject to indeterminate detention and on release to
indefinite supervision and liability to recall. Prisoners who are subject to determinate sentences
may be referred by criminal justice agencies for assessment and possible detention under civil
powers on expiry of their sentence if they pose a continued risk and are suffering from mental
disorder in the new broad sense. Police, probation and other criminal justice personnel are to be
given a role in clinical decision-making.65 The Government’s statement of its determination to
challenge the distorted image of mental disorder and to combat the social exclusion that can result
from it’ is undoubtedly sincere. However, it must be said that the injection of criminal justice
values, practices and personnel into psychiatric decision-making calls into question whether the
new legal framework will help or hinder health and social services in meeting Standard One of the
National Service Framework for Mental Health, when they seek to ‘combat discrimination against
individuals and groups with mental health problems and promote their social inclusion.’66
64 Mental Health Review Tribunals for England and
Wales Annual Report 1997-8, Department of Health
2000, p. 51.
65 This argument is more fully developed in P. Fennell and
V. Yeates, To Serve Which Master? Criminal Justice
Policy, Community Care and the Mentally Disordered
Offender in A Buchanan, Community Care of the
Mentally Disordered Offender (2001) Oxford
University Press, Chapter 13.
66 Cm 5016-l, para. 1.12.
